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Fingerprint individuality refers to the extent of uniqueness of fin-
gerprints and is the main criteria for deciding between a match versus
nonmatch in forensic testimony. Often, prints are subject to varying
levels of noise, for example, the image quality may be low when a
print is lifted from a crime scene. A poor image quality causes human
experts as well as automatic systems to make more errors in feature
detection by either missing true features or detecting spurious ones.
This error lowers the extent to which one can claim individualization
of fingerprints that are being matched. The aim of this paper is to
quantify the decrease in individualization as image quality degrades
based on fingerprint images in real databases. This, in turn, can be
used by forensic experts along with their testimony in a court of law.
An important practical concern is that the databases used typically
consist of a large number of fingerprint images so computational algo-
rithms such as the Gibbs sampler can be extremely slow. We develop
algorithms based on the Laplace approximation of the likelihood and
infer the unknown parameters based on this approximate likelihood.
Two publicly available databases, namely, FVC2002 and FVC2006,
are analyzed from which estimates of individuality are obtained. From
a statistical perspective, the contribution can be treated as an inno-
vative application of Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMMs) to
the field of fingerprint-based authentication.
1. Introduction.
1.1. Fingerprint features, matching and individuality. Fingerprint indi-
viduality is the study of the extent of uniqueness of fingerprints and is the
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Fig. 1. A total of 35 and 49 minutiae were detected in left and right images, respectively,
and w = 7 correspondences (i.e., matches) were found. The white squares and lines, re-
spectively, represent the minutia location and direction. Note that for a minutia ending,
the white line points away from the ridge flow, whereas for a minutia bifurcation, the white
line points along the direction of the merged ridge. Images taken from the publicly available
database FVC2002 DB2.
central premise for expert testimony in court. Assessment of individuality is
made based on comparing features from two fingerprint images such as in
Figure 1. A fingerprint image consists of alternating dark and light smooth
flow lines termed as ridges and valleys. The fingerprint feature formed when
a ridge occasionally either terminates or bifurcates is called a minutia; the
minutia type “ending” and “bifurcation” correspondingly relate to the type
of ridge anomaly that occurs. The location of a minutia is denoted by x
where x ∈ D, D is the image domain. Figure 1 identifies all minutiae as
white squares in the two fingerprint images; the images are from the pub-
licly available database FVC2002. Each white line emanating from the center
of the square represents the minutia direction, denoted by u with u ∈ (0,2π],
which is (i) the direction of the merged ridge flow for a minutia bifurcation,
and (ii) the direction pointing away from the ridge flow for a minutia ending;
see Figure 1. Minutia information of a fingerprint consists of the collection
of locations and directions, (x,u), of all minutiae in the image.
Minutiae in fingerprint images are extracted using pattern recognition al-
gorithms. In this paper, we used the algorithm described in Zhu, Dass and
Jain (2007) for minutia extraction. Minutia information is easy to extract,
and believed to be permanent and unique; that is, minutiae information is
believed to stay the same over time and different individuals have distinct
A MIXED MODEL APPROACH FOR INDIVIDUALITY 3
minutia patterns, thus making it a popular method for identifying individ-
uals in the forensics community. For a pair of prints, a minutia (x,u) in one
print is said to match a minutia (y, v) in the another print if
|x− y|d < r0 and |u− v|a < u0(1.1)
for prespecified small positive numbers r0 and u0, where |x−y|d and |u−v|a,
respectively, denote the Euclidean distance in R2 and the angular distance
|u− v|a =min{|u− v|,2π − |u− v|}.(1.2)
We subsequently assume that a set of minutiae has already been extracted
(or detected) for every fingerprint image under study. Fingerprint-based au-
thentication proceeds by determining the highest possible number of minutia
matches between a pair of prints. This is achieved by an optimal rigid trans-
formation that brings the two sets of minutiae as close to each other as
possible and then counting the number of minutia pairs (x,u) and (y, v)
that satisfy (1.1). For example, the number of minutia matches between the
prints in the left and right panels in Figure 1 is w≡ 7.
A reasonably high degree of match (high w) between the two sets of minu-
tiae leads forensic experts to testify irrefutably that the owner of the two
prints is one and the same person. Central to establishing an identity based
on fingerprint evidence is the assumption of discernible uniqueness; finger-
print minutiae of different individuals are observably different and, therefore,
when two prints share many common minutiae, the experts conclude that
the two different prints are from the same person. The primary concern here
is what constitutes a “reasonably high degree of match?” For example, in
Figure 1, is w = 7 large enough to conclude that the two prints come from
the same person? When fingerprint evidence is presented in a court, the
testimony of experts is almost always included and, on cross-examination,
the foundations and basis of this testimony are rarely questioned. However,
in the case of Daubert vs. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1995), the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that in order for expert forensic testimony to be al-
lowed in courts, it had to be subject to the criteria of scientific validation
[see Pankanti, Prabhakar and Jain (2002) for details]. Following the Daubert
ruling, forensic evidence based on fingerprints was first challenged in the
case of U.S. vs. Byron C. Mitchell (1999) and, subsequently, in 20 other
cases involving fingerprint evidence. The main concern with an expert’s tes-
timony as well as admissibility of fingerprint evidence is the problem of in-
dividualization. The fundamental premise for asserting the extent to which
the prints match each other (i.e., the extent of uniqueness of fingerprints)
has not been scientifically validated and matching error rates are unknown
[Pankanti, Prabhakar and Jain (2002), Zhu, Dass and Jain (2007)]; see also
the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report (2009).
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The central question in a court of law is “What is the uncertainty associ-
ated with the experts’ judgement when matches are decided by fingerprint
evidence?” How likely can an erroneous decision be made for the given latent
print? The main issue with expert testimony is the lack of quantification of
this uncertainty in the decision. To address these concerns, several research
investigations have proposed measures that characterize the extent of finger-
print individuality; see Pankanti, Prabhakar and Jain (2002), Zhu, Dass and
Jain (2007) and the references therein. The primary aim of these measures
is to capture the inherent variability and uncertainty (in the expert’s as-
sessment of a “match”) when an individual is identified based on fingerprint
evidence.
A measure of fingerprint individuality is given by the probability of a
random correspondence (PRC), which is the probability that two sets of
minutiae, one from the query containing m1 minutiae and the other from
the template fingerprint containing m2 minutiae, randomly correspond to
each other with at least w matches. Since large (resp., small) w is a measure
of the extent of similarity (resp., dissimilarity) between a pair of fingerprints,
the PRC should be a decreasing function of w. Mathematically, the PRC
corresponding to w matches is given by
PRC(w|m1,m2) = P (S ≥w|m1,m2),(1.3)
where the random variable S denotes the number of minutia matches that
result when two arbitrary fingerprints from a target population are paired
with each other; the notation used in (1.3) also emphasizes the dependence of
the PRC on the total number of minutiae detected in the two prints, that is,
m1 andm2. It is clear from the above formula that PRC(w|m1,m2) decreases
as w increases for fixed m1 and m2. The distribution of S is governed by
the extent to which minutia matches occur randomly, an unknown quantity
which has been modeled in a variety of ways in the literature. The main aim
of research in fingerprint individuality is to obtain reliable inference on the
PRC, which is also unknown as a result of the unknown extent of random
minutia matches.
1.2. Minutia matching models. Several fingerprint minutia matching
models and expressions for the PRC have been developed from a completely
theoretical perspective [see Pankanti, Prabhakar and Jain (2002) for a de-
tailed account of these models]. These models are distributions elicited for
minutia occurrences, that is, the distributions that arise from viewing each
minutia (x,u) as a random occurrence in the fingerprint, occurring indepen-
dently of each other. A major drawback of these works is that the models
for minutia occurrences, and consequently matching probabilities and PRCs,
are not validated based on actual fingerprint images. This effort was first
carried out in Pankanti, Prabhakar and Jain (2002) based on real fingerprint
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databases, albeit for a simple minutia matching model. Subsequent improve-
ments on validating matching models based on actual fingerprint databases
have been carried out in Zhu, Dass and Jain (2007) and several other works.
Zhu, Dass and Jain (2007), for example, demonstrated that when the num-
ber of minutiae in the prints are moderate to large, the distribution of S
in (1.3) can be approximated by a Poisson distribution with mean λ, the
expected number of random matches, given by
λ= λ(f1, f2) =m1m2
(
2πr20u0
∫
D
∫
(0,2pi]
f1(x,u)f2(x,u)dxdu
)
,(1.4)
based on the minutia distributions f1 and f2 for prints 1 and 2, respec-
tively; in (1.4), m1 and m2 are, respectively, the number of minutiae in
prints 1 and 2, and r0 and u0 are as in (1.1). The above formula for
the mean number of random matches can be understood in the following
way: The total number of pairings available for random matching from m1
minutiae in print 1 and m2 minutiae in print 2 is m1m2. The expression
2πr20u0
∫
D
∫
(0,2pi] f1(x,u)f2(x,u)dxdu represents the probability of a single
random match when r0 and u0 are small compared to the image size. It
follows from the expected value of a binomial distribution that λ in (1.4)
is the mean number of successes (i.e., random matches). The contribution
of Zhu, Dass and Jain (2007) was to characterize the distribution of S (the
extent of random matching in the target population) by a single number,
namely, the probability of a (single) random match between two minutiae,
one from each of the prints in question. Since the probability of a random
match
p(f1, f2) = 2πr
2
0u0
∫
D
∫
(0,2pi]
f1(x,u)f2(x,u)dxdu(1.5)
depends on the minutia distributions f1 and f2, Zhu, Dass and Jain (2007)
inferred these distributions from actual fingerprint databases by representing
them as a finite mixture of normals.
Factors other than the minutia distributions also govern the extent of
random matches. In the case of forensic testimony, for example, it is rea-
sonable to believe that expert matching is more prone to error if the latent
prints are of poor quality. Here, poor quality images mean poor resolution
(or clarity) of the ridge-valley structures (e.g., in the presence of smudges,
sweaty fingers, cuts and bruises) due to which the detection of true minutiae
can be missed and spurious minutiae can be detected; see Figure 2 for exam-
ples of good, moderate and poor quality fingerprint images. In other words,
the extent of individualization should be smaller when the underlying im-
age qualities are poor. One critical issue, therefore, is to be able to quantify
the increase in PRC with respect to quality degradation for each matching
number w. This quantification is crucial, for example, for latent prints lifted
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Fig. 2. Fingerprint images with (a) good (b) moderate and (c) poor quality. White
squares and lines indicate locations and directions of detected minutiae, and possibly not
true ones in panel (c); images taken from the publicly available FVC2002 databases.
from crime scenes which are known to have inferior image quality. In the
presence of poor quality, automatic as well as manual extraction of finger-
print features are prone to more errors through (i) increased likelihood of
detecting spurious minutiae and (ii) missing true ones. Previous work has
not quantified the effects of (i) and (ii) on fingerprint individuality; see Dass
(2010).
1.3. Objective and contributions. The aim of this paper is to quantify
PRC assessment (and hence fingerprint individuality) in the presence of
varying image quality. The methodology involves two main steps. (i) First,
a class of generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) is proposed that con-
sists of two levels. At the top level, the Poisson model is elicited as the dis-
tribution for the number of random minutia matches, following the deriva-
tion of Zhu, Dass and Jain (2007). At the second level, image quality of
the two prints in question are incorporated as covariates. Also, inter-finger
variability is modeled using variance components in the second level. (ii)
Second, an inference procedure for the PRC is developed to accommodate a
large number of images from different fingers as is typical in real fingerprint
databases. Efficient computational algorithms are essential for arriving at
reliable reports of fingerprint individuality in practice. Since the number of
fingerprint images in real databases is typically large, inference based on
Bayesian computational algorithms such as the Gibbs sampler is extremely
slow due to increased dimensions of the parameter space. To alleviate this
problem, the asymptotic Laplace approximation of the GLMM likelihood is
used instead. To summarize, contributions of this paper are as follows: For
fingerprint-based authentication, a procedure is developed for obtaining the
PRC based on explicitly modeling the occurrence of spurious minutia on im-
age quality degradation. Statistical contributions include (i) an innovative
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application of GLMM to fingerprint-based authentication, and (ii) the devel-
opment of computationally fast algorithms achieved by approximating the
GLMM likelihood (with associated theoretical and numerical validation).
Inference results (point estimates and credible intervals) on the PRC are
also given (see the experimental results section—Section 6).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3 discusses the log-
linear GLMM model that is used to study how PRCs change as a function
of the underlying image quality. Section 4 presents the procedure for fitting
GLMMs in a Bayesian framework. Section 5 develops the inference procedure
(point estimates and credible intervals) on the PRC. Section 6 obtains the
estimates of fingerprint individuality based on the FVC2002 and FVC2006
databases and gives an analysis of the numerical results. Section 7 validates
the Laplace approximation and various other approximations used in this
paper for efficient computation. Section 8 presents the summary, conclusions
and other relevant discussions.
2. Fingerprint databases and empirical findings.
2.1. Fingerprint databases. Fingerprint databases that have been used
in fingerprint analysis include the FVC (e.g., FVC2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006)
and NIST databases (e.g., NIST Special Database 4, 9, 27, etc.) which are
publicly available for download and analysis. These fingerprint databases
typically consist of images acquired from F different fingers, obtained by
placing the finger onto the sensing plate of an image acquisition device.
Each finger is sensed multiple times, possibly a different number of times
for the different fingers. The databases have a common number of multiple
acquisitions, say, L, for each finger, resulting in total of FL images in the
database. Due to the different sensors used as well as varying placement
of the finger, per individual, onto the sensing plate, the images acquired
exhibit significant variability (even for the same finger); see Figure 3 for
several examples from two of the databases used in this paper, namely,
FVC2002 (DB1 and DB2) and FVC2006 (DB3). For FVC2002 DB1 and
DB2, F = 100 and L = 8, whereas for FVC2006 DB3, F = 150 with L =
15. Figure 3 gives an idea of the intra-finger variability (variability due to
multiple impressions) that has to be taken into account in addition to image
quality variability. Intra-finger variability gives different matching numbers
when different impressions are used for the matching between two fingers.
2.2. Empirical findings for varying image quality. In practice, the qual-
ity of an image can be either ordinal (i.e., taking values in an ordered la-
bel set) or quantitative (i.e., taking values in a continuum, usually in a
bounded interval [a, b]). We have considered one specific choice of each type
of quality measure: (i) The categorical quality extractor “NFIQ,” which is
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Fig. 3. Sample images from the FVC2002 DB1, DB2 and FVC2006 DB3 databases;
impression f–l refers to the lth impression of the f th finger. Top, middle and bottom rows
are images from the FVC2002 DB1, DB2 and FVC2006 DB3 databases, respectively; all
images are publicly available.
an implementation of the “NIST Image Quality” algorithm based on neu-
ral networks described in Tabassi, Wilson and Watson (2004), and (ii) the
minutia quality extractor obtained from the feature extraction algorithm
mindtct from NIST (see the Home Office Automatic Fingerprint Recogni-
tion System [HOAFRS (1993)]). These algorithms are all publicly available.
For the NFIQ quality extractor, the output Q0 is a quality label numbered
1,2, . . . ,5, with 1 and 5 corresponding to the best and worst quality images,
respectively. For the continuous quality extractor by mindtct, a real number
Qcon between 0 and 1 is obtained with higher values indicating better qual-
ity images. To maintain consistency between the two quality measures, we
relabel the categorial measure as Qcat =Qmax + 1−Q0, where Qmax is the
maximum label for a given database, so that higher labels indicate better
quality images.
For a pair of prints, 1 and 2 say, with m1 and m2 minutiae, respectively,
let Y denote the observed number of minutia matches between them. We
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Table 1
Mean and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of Y (the observed number of random
matches) for Qcat pairs for FVC2002 DB1 and DB2 in panels (a) and (b)
Q1/Q2 1 2 3
1 3.36 3.43 4.15
(1.11) (1.14) (1.36)
2 3.73 4.02 4.94
(1.13) (1.19) (1.41)
3 4.57 4.96 6.38
(1.40) (1.43) (1.71)
Q1/Q2 1 2 3 4
1 2.20 3.02 3.36 3.76
(0.42) (0.76) (0.90) (1.00)
2 2.96 3.91 4.21 5.12
(0.75) (1.30) (1.39) (1.71)
3 3.19 4.26 4.71 5.77
(0.82) (1.26) (1.32) (1.57)
4 3.74 5.26 5.96 7.47
(0.99) (1.51) (1.58) (1.91)
(a) (b)
consider only impostor matches (matches between impressions of different
fingers) which are equivalent to the notion of random matching when as-
sessing fingerprint individuality. The total number of impostor pairs in a
database with F fingers and L impressions per finger is F (F −1)L2/2 (since
the order of the prints is immaterial). Suppose (Q1,Q2) are the labels for the
categorical measure Qcat. Table 1 gives the average number (and standard
deviations) of matches Y¯ for each quality bin pair based on FVC2002 DB1
and DB2. Note that the average number of matches is an increasing func-
tion of the quality labels, that is, the average number of random matches
increases as the image quality becomes better. This seems counterintuitive
initially, but we note that the average increases because the total number of
minutiae extracted from the two prints also increases as quality gets better.
With more minutiae available for random pairings, the number of matches
based on such pairings should also increase on the average. Table 2 gives
the mean number (and standard deviations) of minutiae for each quality
bin for the two databases considered to illustrate this trend. The minutia
extraction algorithm mindtct detects (or extracts) a minutia only if its com-
puted reliability measure (computed within the program) is above a certain
threshold. For better quality images, more minutiae have a reliability index
above the threshold, which explains the higher number extracted in better
quality images.
Consequently, a better quantity to model for varying image quality is
Y/(m1m2), which is an estimate of the probability of a random match based
on the Poisson model of Zhu, Dass and Jain (2007) [see (1.4) and (1.5)]. Ta-
ble 3 gives the average value of Y/(m1m2) (and standard deviations) for
the different quality bins. Note that now the averages are decreasing as a
function of Qcat. Intuitively, this is expected since it is less likely to obtain a
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Table 2
Mean and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of m1m2 (the total number of possible
random pairings) for Qcat pairs for FVC2002 DB1 and DB2 in panels (a) and (b)
Q1/Q2 1 2 3
1 357 403 641
(239) (219) (336)
2 490 594 947
(260) (221) (327)
3 768 921 1459
(383) (301) (440)
Q1/Q2 1 2 3 4
1 177 366 482 705
(53) (144) (148) (203)
2 338 684 835 1295
(178) (395) (445) (634)
3 414 845 1036 1596
(138) (368) (350) (485)
4 650 1342 1682 2546
(192) (527) (491) (655)
(a) (b)
random match when the image quality is high for a pair of impostor finger-
prints. More importantly, we can attribute the larger values of Y/(m1m2)
for poor quality images to the extraction of spurious minutiae. The prob-
ability of a random match based on true minutiae is intrinsic to the two
prints in question and depends only on the distributions f1 and f2. Thus,
this probability should not depend on quality if all true minutiae are cor-
rectly identified. The probability of a random match, p, in the presence
of noisy (both spurious and true) minutiae is the sum of four component
probabilities:
p= p(0,0) + p(0,1) + p(1,0) + p(1,1),(2.1)
where p(u,v) is the probability of a random match with minutia of type u
from print 1 and type v from print 2; u = 0,1 for true or spurious minu-
tia from print 1, and v = 0,1 for true or spurious minutia from print 2.
Table 3
Mean and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of Y/(m1m2) (the probability of a random
pairing) for Qcat pairs for FVC2002 DB1 and DB2 in panels (a) and (b)
Q1/Q2 1 2 3
1 0.0127 0.0105 0.0077
(0.0083) (0.0057) (0.0036)
2 0.0092 0.0075 0.0056
(0.0046) (0.0030) (0.0019)
3 0.0069 0.0058 0.0046
(0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0013)
Q1/Q2 1 2 3 4
1 0.0131 0.0090 0.0074 0.0056
(0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0021)
2 0.0104 0.0068 0.0058 0.0044
(0.0042) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0017)
3 0.0083 0.0056 0.0049 0.0038
(0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0012)
4 0.0060 0.0043 0.0037 0.0030
(0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0009)
(a) (b)
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From earlier discussion, it follows that p(0,0) does not depend on (Q1,Q2),
whereas p(0,1), p(1,0) and p(1,1) all increase as either or both quality labels
(Q1,Q2) decrease. In the GLMM framework, the dependence of p
(0,1), p(1,0)
and p(1,1) on quality is modeled explicitly. The above discussion is presented
for the categorical quality measure Qcat, but similar empirical findings are
also obtained for Qcon by binning the values in the range [0,1].
3. GLMM framework for fingerprint individuality. Let a fingerprint
database consists of F fingers and L impressions per finger. Each finger-
print image in the database corresponds to a fingerprint impression denoted
by the index pair (f, l) with 1≤ f ≤ F and 1≤ l ≤ L; here f and l, respec-
tively, are the indices of the finger and the impression. An impostor pair
of fingerprint images (i, j) with i ≡ (f, l) and j ≡ (f ′, l′) arise from differ-
ent fingers, that is, f 6= f ′. The collection of all impostor pairs arising from
the database is denoted by I with N ≡ F (F − 1)L2/2. For each impostor
pair (i, j) ≡ ((f, l), (f ′, l′)), the matching algorithm presented in Section 1
[see (1.1) and (1.2)] computes the observed number of minutia matches, Yij ,
between impressions i and j. The image quality of i and j is obtained by
a quality extractor Q that outputs the ordered pair (Qi,Qj) which for the
moment is taken to be continuous (the categorical quality case is discussed
later).
Based on the discussion in the previous section, the total number of
matches Yij is expressed as a sum of four components:
Yij =
1∑
u=0
1∑
v=0
Y
(u,v)
ij ,(3.1)
where Y
(u,v)
ij is the number of matches obtained based on minutia of type
u for impression i and minutia of type v for impression j [see (2.1) and the
ensuing discussion in Section 2.2]. The rest of the GLMMmodel specification
is
Y
(u,v)
ij ∼ Poisson(λ
(u,v)
ij ),(3.2)
independently for each combination of (u, v),
λ
(u,v)
ij =mimj exp{bf + bf ′ + η
(u,v)
ij }(3.3)
with η
(u,v)
ij for various combinations (u, v) given as
η
(0,0)
ij = 2β0,(3.4)
η
(0,1)
ij = β0 + θ0 + θ1Qj,(3.5)
η
(1,0)
ij = β0 + θ0 + θ1Qi and(3.6)
η
(1,1)
ij = 2θ0 + θ1(Qi +Qj).(3.7)
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In (3.3), mi and mj are, respectively, the number of extracted minutiae from
i and j. The GLMM model of (3.1)–(3.7) consists of unknown fixed effects
parameters (θ0, θ1, β0) and random effect parameters bf with bf ∼N(0, σ
2)
independently for f = 1,2, . . . , F for unknown variance σ2 > 0.
Comparing (1.4) and (3.3), we note that the probability of a random
match p(f1, f2) [see (1.5)] is modeled as exp{bf + bf ′ + η
(u,v)
ij } with random
effects bf and bf ′ in the GLMM framework. The reason for this is as fol-
lows: The assessment of fingerprint individuality is typically carried out for
a target population with different individuals. Hence, f1 and f2 are ran-
dom realizations of prints from the target population. While each f1 and
f2 is modeled as a mixture of normals, Zhu, Dass and Jain (2007) subse-
quently proceed with a clustering of these estimated f1 and f2 for a given
database. The assumption made is that the target population (and, hence,
the database which is considered a representative of the target population)
consists of unknownK different clusters of hyperdistributions (a distribution
on the mixtures) from which f1 and f2 are realized. Subsequent development
of the clustering of mixtures of normals is reported in Dass and Li (2009)
where the uncertainty of estimating the hyperdistribution is accounted for
in the assessment of PRC. In the present context, the random effects bf
(and bf ′) account for variability due to different fingers (each finger f has a
distribution on its minutiae) which are assumed to be realizations from the
target population. The fixed effect parameters (θ0, θ1, β0, σ
2) are target pop-
ulation specific: Their values can change when we move from one database
to another.
It follows that the parameters (θ0, θ1, β0) should be all negative. More
elaborate restrictions can be placed on the random and fixed effects param-
eters jointly by requiring that bf + bf ′+η
(u,v)
ij ≤ 0 for all (u, v) and (i, j), but
we choose not to pursue estimation and subsequent Bayesian inference in
this complicated feasibility region. The posterior estimates of (θ0, θ1, β0, σ
2)
obtained in the experimental results section demonstrate that the restric-
tions are satisfied naturally: Estimates of (θ0, θ1, β0) are found to be negative
for all the databases we worked with. Further, we found the estimate of σ
to be so small relative to (θ0, θ1, β0) that the restrictions bf + bf ′ + η
(u,v)
ij ≤ 0
satisfied automatically for all realized values of bf and bf ′ when computing
the PRC.
For a categorical quality measure labeled in increasing order of image
quality, (3.4)–(3.7) in the GLMM framework are replaced by the following
four equations for η
(u,v)
ij :
η
(0,0)
ij = 2β0,(3.8)
η
(0,1)
ij = β0 + θ0 + θ1 + · · ·+ θ(Qj−1),(3.9)
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η
(1,0)
ij = β0 + θ0 + θ1 + · · ·+ θ(Qi−1) and(3.10)
η
(1,1)
ij = 2θ0 + θ1 + · · ·+ θ(Qi−1) + θ1 + · · ·+ θ(Qj−1),(3.11)
where the fixed effects parameters are now (θ0, θ1, . . . , θ(Qmax−1)) and β0
which are all negative.
Equations (3.4)–(3.7) for a continuous quality measure and (3.8)–(3.11)
for a categorical quality measure imply that the matching between type
u minutia from print 1 and type v minutia from print 2 are indepen-
dent of each other. To see this, note that the probability of a random
match in (2.1), p = p(0,0) + p(0,1) + p(1,0) + p(1,1), is the sum of four com-
ponent probabilities depending on the type of minutiae being matched.
It follows that each normalized term p(u,v)/p gives the multinomial prob-
ability that type u minutia is paired with type v minutia, conditional on
the fact that a random pairing has occurred. For the GLMM framework,
we get p(u,v)/p = eη
(u,v)
ij /
∑1
u=0
∑1
v=0 e
ηij(u,v). Consequently, the odds ratio
p(1,1)p(0,0)
p(0,1)p(1,0)
= 1 for both the continuous and categorical quality measures. In
other words, spurious minutia locations are dispersed “evenly” in between
the true minutiae. No region in the print is more prone to spurious de-
tection in relation to the distribution of true minutiae in the fingerprint
impression. We further note that p
(u,1)
p(u,0)
= eθ0+θ1Qj−β0 for the continuous and
p(u,1)
p(u,0)
= e
θ0+θ1+···+θ(Qj−1)−β0 for the categorical quality measures. These ex-
pressions suggest that θ1 for the continuous and θ1, . . . , θ(Qmax−1) for cat-
egorical quality measures should all be negative: As Qj increases (better
quality image), the odds of pairing with spurious minutiae (v = 1 versus
v = 0) should decrease for each minutia type u= 0,1.
For both the categorical and continuous quality measures, equation (3.3)
can be rewritten in the general log-linear form with respect to the fixed and
random effects parameters. For each fixed (u, v), this is given by
logλ
(u,v)
ij =Kij + δij(u, v),(3.12)
where Kij = log(mimj) and δij(u, v) = x
′
ij(u, v)θ + z
′
ijb for appropriate
choices of the 1 × p row vector x′ij(u, v) and 1 × F row vector z
′
ij [which
is independent of (u, v)]; θ and b= (b1, b2, . . . , bF )
′, respectively, are p× 1
and F × 1 column vectors representing the collection of fixed and random
effects parameters. For the continuous quality measure, the parameter vec-
tor θ = (θ0, θ1, β0)
′ with p = 3, whereas θ = (θ0, θ1, . . . , θ(Qmax−1), β0)
′ with
p=Qmax+1 for the categorical quality measure. We also denote τ = (θ
′, σ2)′
to be the (p+1)×1 vector consisting of all unknown fixed effects parameters.
In matrix notation, the GLMM for each fixed (u, v) is given by
Y
(u,v)
ij ∼ Poisson(e
Kij+δij(u,v)) independently for each (i, j) ∈ I(3.13)
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and
δ(u, v) =X(u, v)θ +Zb,(3.14)
where δ(u, v) is the N ×1 vector consisting of δij(u, v)s, X(u, v) is the N ×p
matrix with rows consisting of x′ij(u, v), and Z is the N × F matrix with
rows comprising of z′ij .
4. Inference methodology. The subsequent subsections develop inference
methodology for τ ≡ (θ′, σ2)′ in a Bayesian framework.
4.1. Exact GLMM likelihood. The following notation is developed for the
ensuing discussion. Let Yuv = {Y
(u,v)
ij : (i, j) ∈ I} denote the missing data
component comprised of minutia matches of type (u, v) for all impostor
pairs. We also denote Ymis and Yobs to be the collection of all missing
and observed matching numbers, that is, Ymis = (Y00,Y01,Y10,Y11) and
Yobs = {Yij , (i, j) ∈ I}, respectively. The set of feasible values for Ymis is
given by the set
M=
{
Ymis :
1∑
u=0
1∑
v=0
Y
(u,v)
ij = Yij for all (i, j) ∈ I
}
.(4.1)
All subsequent analysis is conditional on the random effects b. The missing
data component Yuv has a likelihood ℓuv(Yuv|θ,b) = e
−huv(Yuv ,θ,b), where
huv(Yuv,θ,b) =−
∑
(i,j)∈I
{(x′ij(u, v)θ + z
′
ijb+Kij)Y
(u,v)
ij
(4.2)
− exp(x′ij(u, v)θ + z
′
ijb+Kij)− log(Y
(u,v)
ij !)}
based on the GLMM model. Since the (u, v) pairs are independent of each
other, the complete likelihood, or the likelihood of Ymis, is
ℓc(Ymis|θ,b) = exp
(
−
1∑
u=0
1∑
v=0
huv(Yuv,θ,b)
)
.(4.3)
The observed likelihood, or the likelihood of Yobs, is the marginal of ℓc
summing over Ymis ∈M. Thus, we have
ℓobs(Yobs|θ,b) =
∑
Ymis∈M
ℓc(Ymis|θ,b) = e
−h(θ,b)(4.4)
with
h(θ,b) =−
∑
(i,j)∈I
{(Hij(θ) + z
′
ijb+Kij)Yij
− exp(x′ij(u, v)θ + z
′
ijb+Kij)− log(Yij!)}
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and
Hij(θ) = log
1∑
u=0
1∑
v=0
exp{x′ij(u, v)θ};(4.5)
the last equality in (4.4) results from simplifications based on the well-known
multinomial formula. Finally, marginalizing over b, the marginal likelihood
for Yobs given τ = (θ
′, σ2)′, denoted by ℓ(τ ), becomes
ℓ(τ ) =
∫
RF
ℓobs(Yobs|θ,b)
e−b
′b/(2σ2)
(2π)F/2σF
db=
∫
RF
exp{−g(τ ,b)}db,(4.6)
where
g(τ ,b) = h(θ,b) + h1(σ
2,b),(4.7)
h1(σ
2,b) =
1
2σ2
b
′
b+
F
2
logσ2 +
F
2
log(2π)(4.8)
and the dependence of ℓ(τ ) on Yobs is suppressed for convenience of the
subsequent presentation.
4.2. Laplace approximation of the likelihood and Bayesian inference. The
typical approach for obtaining inference on τ in a Bayesian framework is to
utilize the Gibbs sampler. The Gibbs sampler augments the random effects
vector b as additional parameters to be estimated and, on convergence, gives
samples from the posterior distribution of (τ ,b). This parameter augmen-
tation step avoids computing the integral in the likelihood (4.6). However,
in the case of fingerprint databases, F , the number of fingers in a database,
is typically large. As a result, parameter augmentation schemes such as the
Gibbs sampler take a considerably long time to run until convergence and
hinder any possibility of real time inference.
We avoid using any parameter augmentation scheme for the inference on
τ . Our approach is to derive an approximation of the GLMM likelihood ℓ(τ )
based on the Laplace expansion given by
ℓa(τ ) = e
−g(τ ,bˆ(τ ))
[
det
(
1
2π
∂2g(τ , bˆ(τ ))
∂τ 2
)]−1/2
,(4.9)
where g(τ ,b) is the function defined in (4.6), bˆ(τ ) is the maximum likelihood
estimate of b for fixed τ , and ∂2g(τ , bˆ(τ ))/∂τ 2 is the matrix of second order
partial derivatives with respect to b evaluated at b = bˆ(τ ), see Shun and
McCullagh (1995). In the supplemental article [Dass, Lim and Maiti (2014)],
we show that
log(ℓ(τ )) = log(ℓa(τ ))
(
1 +O
(
1
F
))
(4.10)
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as F →∞, meaning that the Laplace approximation log(ℓa(τ )) is accurate
up to order O(1/F ) as F →∞. Equation (4.10) justifies the use of the
Laplace-based approximate likelihood in place of (4.6) when F is large.
A further approximation to log(ℓa(τ )) is obtained by observing that
log(ℓa(τ )) =−g(τ , bˆ(τ ))−
1
2
logdet
(
1
2π
∂2g(τ , bˆ(τ ))
∂τ 2
)
(4.11)
≡ (A) + (B)
is the sum of two terms: the first term (A) involves a summation over F (F −
1)L2/2 terms and, hence, is of that order as F →∞. The order of the second
term (B) is F log(F − 1 + 1/σ2) which follows from ∂2g(τ , bˆ(τ ))/∂τ 2 ∼
(F − 1 + 1/σ2)IF , where IF is the F × F identity matrix. This is because
each diagonal entry of ∂2g(τ , bˆ(τ ))/∂τ 2 involves a sum over F − 1 terms
together with one term involving 1/σ2, whereas the off-diagonal entries are
each of order 1. We retain the term 1/σ2 in the case when 1/σ2 is of the
same order as F for small σ2. Nevertheless, F (F − 1)L2/2 still dominates
over F log(F − 1 + 1/σ2) for large F and small σ2 (where σ2 ∼ F−1). This
implies that (A) dominates (B) for large F and small σ2 which motivates the
further approximation of log(ℓa(τ )) by (A). In Section 6, we show that the
above approximation is valid based on the estimated values of σ2 and choices
of F and L for each database we worked with. The reader is also referred to
further details on the approximation presented in the supplemental article
[Dass, Lim and Maiti (2014)].
We assume that the maximum likelihood estimate of τ , τˆ , is available for
the moment. Expanding (A) in a Taylor’s series around τˆ , we get
g(τ , bˆ(τ ))≈ g(τˆ , bˆ(τˆ )) +
1
2
(τ − τˆ )′
(
∂2g(τˆ , bˆ(τˆ ))
∂τ 2
)
(τ − τˆ ),(4.12)
where ∂2g(τˆ , bˆ(τˆ ))/∂τ 2 is the matrix ∂2g(τ , bˆ(τ ))/∂τ 2 evaluated at τ = τˆ .
It is challenging to numerically evaluate τˆ and ∂2g(τˆ , bˆ(τˆ ))/∂τ 2 in real time.
This problem is addressed in greater detail in Section 4.3 subsequently.
For inference in the Bayesian framework, we consider a prior π0 on τ
of the product form: π0(τ ) = π0(θ)π0(σ
2) with π0(θ) ∝ 1 and π0(σ
2) ∝
(1/σ2)I(σ2 > 0). These are standard noninformative priors used on location
and scale parameters in Bayesian literature. Based on the likelihood and
prior specifications, the exact and approximate posteriors of τ (conditional
on Yobs) are
π(τ |Yobs) =
ℓ(τ )× π0(τ )∫
τ
ℓ(τ )× π0(τ )dτ
(4.13)
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≈
ℓa(τ )× π0(τ )∫
τ
ℓa(τ )× π0(τ )dτ
(4.14)
= πa(τ |Yobs),(4.15)
say, based on equation (4.10). The first likelihood ℓ(τ ) is difficult to evaluate
due to the integral with respect to b, whereas the second likelihood ℓa(τ )
is easier to evaluate for each τ but difficult to simulate from. However,
based on equations (4.11) and (4.12), we obtain samples of τ from π˜(τ ),
the multivariate normal distribution with mean τˆ and covariance matrix
∂2g(τˆ , bˆ(τˆ ))/∂τ 2. An importance sampling scheme is then used to convert
these realizations to posterior samples from πa(τ |Yobs). More specifically,
suppose τ ∗h, h= 1,2, . . . ,H are H samples from π˜. Define the H weights w
∗
h,
h= 1,2, . . . ,H by
w∗h =
πa(τ
∗
h)
Dπ˜(τ ∗h)
,(4.16)
whereD =
∑H
h=1 πa(τ
∗
h)/π˜(τ
∗
h) is the normalizing constant so that
∑H
h=1w
∗
h =
1. To obtain a sample from πa(τ |Yobs) in (4.15), we resample from the col-
lection τ ∗h with weights w
∗
h for h = 1,2, . . . ,H . This procedure is repeated
R times to obtain R samples from πa(τ |Yobs). Numerical analysis showed
that the weights w∗h are uniformly distributed with value around 1/H , which
indicates the effectiveness of approximating the target posterior density πa
using the Gaussian approximation π˜.
4.3. Obtaining τˆ using EM algorithm. The previous sections assume the
availability of the maximum likelihood estimate τˆ of τ which we now de-
scribe how to obtain. The estimator τˆ is obtained based on the maximizing
function −g(τ , bˆ(τ )). From equations (4.10) and (4.11), it is clear that τˆ
also approximately maximizes the log-likelihood function log(ℓa(τ )) and,
subsequently, log(ℓ(τ )), for large F . Ignoring constant terms, we note that
− g(τ , bˆ(τ )) =−h(θ, bˆ(τ ))− h1(τ , bˆ(τ ))(4.17)
= log
( ∑
Ymis∈M
ℓc(Ymis|θ, bˆ(τ ))
)
− h1(σ
2, bˆ(τ )),(4.18)
where the function h(θ,b) and ℓc are as defined in (4.4) and
h1(σ
2,b) =
1
2σ2
b
′
b+
F
2
logσ2.(4.19)
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Equation (4.18) sets the stage for an EM algorithm to be used: Start with
an initial estimate τ = τ 0 = (θ0, σ
2
0) and obtain τ = τ k = (θk, σ
2
k) at the end
of the kth step. At step (k + 1), the E-step is carried out by noting that
the conditional distribution of (Y
(u,v)
ij , u= 0,1, v = 0,1) is multinomial with
total number of trials Yij and multinomial probabilities
p
(u,v)
ij,k =
exij(u,v)
′
θk∑1
u=0
∑1
v=0 e
xij(u,v)′θk
independently for each (i, j) ∈ I . Subsequently, we plug in the expected
value of each Y
(u,v)
ij , Y
(u,v)
ij,k ≡ Yijp
(u,v)
ij,k in place of Y
(u,v)
ij in (4.2) and (4.3).
The M -step now entails maximizing the objective function −gc(τ , bˆ(τ ))
with respect to τ , where
gc(τ ,b) = hc(θ,b) + h1(σ
2,b)(4.20)
and hc(θ,b) is given by
hc(θ,b) =
1∑
u=0
1∑
v=0
∑
(i,j)∈I
{(x′ij(u, v)θ + z
′
ijb+Kij)Y
(u,v)
ij,k
(4.21)
+ exp(x′ij(u, v)θ+ z
′
ijb+Kij)}.
This maximization yields τ = τ k+1. Proceeding with k = 1,2, . . . gives τ = τˆ
at convergence.
TheM -step, or maximization of −gc(τ , bˆ(τ )) with respect to τ , is carried
out using the Newton–Raphson procedure involving the first and second
order partial derivatives of gc with respect to τ . At step (k + 1) of the EM
algorithm, we start with the initial value τ ≡ τ 0k+1 ≡ τ k as defined above. At
step (l+1), the current value τ l+1k+1 is obtained from τ
l
k+1 using the equation
τ
l+1
k+1 = τ
l
k+1 −
[
∂2gc
∂τ 2
(τ lk+1, bˆ(τ
l
k+1))
]−1∂gc
∂τ
(τ lk+1, bˆ(τ
l
k+1)),(4.22)
where ∂
2gc
∂τ 2 (τ
l
k+1, bˆ(τ
l
k+1)) and
∂gc
∂τ (τ
l
k+1, bˆ(τ
l
k+1)) are, respectively, the first
and second order partial derivatives of gc evaluated at τ = τ
l
k+1. The explicit
expressions for the first and second order partial derivatives of gc(τ , bˆ(τ ))
with respect to τ are given in the supplemental article Dass, Lim and Maiti
(2014). These expressions, in turn, involve the first and second order partial
derivatives of bˆ(τ ) with respect to τ . Since no analytical form of bˆ(τ )
as a function of τ is available, one has to resort to numerical methods to
estimate bˆ(τ ), its first and second order partial derivatives at each iterative
step of k ≥ 0 and l≥ 0. A fast and effective way of obtaining these numerical
estimates is outlined in the supplemental article Dass, Lim and Maiti (2014)
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for the interested reader. On convergence at τ = τˆ , one obtains the numerical
estimate of the matrix ∂2g(τˆ , bˆ(τˆ ))/∂τ 2 by a similar method. The reader is
referred to the supplemental article Dass, Lim and Maiti (2014) for details.
5. Bayesian inference for the PRC. Suppose w minutia matches are ob-
served for a fingerprint pair with total number of detected minutiae m1
and m2, and with quality measures Q1 and Q2 (assume continuous for the
moment). Due to varying image quality, not all of the w matches corre-
spond to matches between genuine (true) minutiae. The model developed
in Section 3 gives the number of true minutia matches, Y (0,0), to be bi-
nomially distributed with parameters w and p00 ≡ e
η(0,0)/
∑1
u=0
∑1
v=0 e
η(u,v)
for the number of trials and success probability, respectively, where η(u,v)
are as defined in (3.4)–(3.7). The binomial distribution for Y (0,0) results
by observing that the conditional distribution of independent Poisson ran-
dom variables (Y (u,v), u, v = {0,1}) given their sum Y =
∑1
u=0
∑1
v=0 Y
(u,v) =
w is multinomial with total number of trials w and probabilities puv ≡
eη
(u,v)
/
∑1
u=0
∑1
v=0 e
η(u,v) summing to one. It follows that the marginal dis-
tribution of each Y (u,v) is binomial for each (u, v) = (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) and
(1,1). Assuming Y (0,0) is known, the PRC corresponding to Y (0,0) matches
is given by
PRC∗(Y (0,0)|b1, b2,m1,m2,τ ) = P (S ≥ Y
(0,0)),(5.1)
where S ∼ Poisson(m1m2e
η) and η = 2β0+b1+b2 with b1 and b2 distributed
as independent N(0, σ2) random variables. The notation of PRC∗(·| · · ·) in
(5.1) emphasizes its dependence on the GLMM parameters τ , the unob-
served matches between genuine minutiae, Y (0,0), and the random effects
parameters b1 and b2. Since (Y
(0,0), b1, b2) are unknown, the unconditional
PRC is obtained by integrating out all unknown random parameters, that
is,
PRC(w|m1,m2,τ ) =Eb1,b2,Y (0,0) [PRC
∗(Y (0,0)|b1, b2,m1,m2,τ )],(5.2)
where the expectation is taken over the joint distribution of (Y (0,0), b1, b2)
given τ . The random variables b1 and b2 are independent from each other
based on our modeling assumptions, but note further that Y (0,0) is indepen-
dent of (b1, b2). This is because the p00 parameter of the binomial distribu-
tion of Y (0,0), conditional on b1 and b2, is independent of b1 and b2 (they
cancel out from the numerator and denominator expressions of p00). Thus,
for given τ , it is easy to sample from the joint distribution (Y (0,0), b1, b2) and
estimate the expectation using a Monte Carlo sum. To obtain inference for
the PRC, assume M samples from the posterior πa(τ |Yobs), τ 1,τ 2, . . . ,τM ,
are available. For r = 1,2, . . . ,R, we obtain the rth sample of the PRC,
PRCr ≡ PRC(w|m1,m2,τ r), by plugging τ = τ r in (5.2). These R posterior
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samples are then used to obtain the PRC posterior mean, standard devia-
tion and the 100(1−α)% credible intervals (mean ±z1−α/2 sd) in Section 6.
Note that PRC(w|m1,m2,τ ) in (5.2) should be the same value whether we
use the combination (Q1,Q2) or (Q2,Q1). Although this symmetry can be
established mathematically, small deviations away from symmetry arise due
to sampling error when (i) approximating the expected value in (5.2) using
Monte Carlo, and (ii) using different random samples from the posterior of τ
for the two combinations (Q1,Q2) and (Q2,Q1). Thus, a common estimate
is reported in Section 6 which is the average of the estimates obtained for
the two combinations (Q1,Q2) and (Q2,Q1).
6. Data analysis. The publicly available databases provided by the Fin-
gerprint Verification Competitions [FVCs, Maio et al. (2002) and FVC2006]
are considered here. Specifically, subsets DB1 and DB2 of FVC2002 and
subset DB3 of FVC2006 are used. The FVC2002 DB1 database consists of
fingerprint images of F = 100 different fingers and L = 8 impressions per
finger obtained using the optical sensor “TouchView II” by Identix with
image size 388× 374 and resolution 500 dots per inch (dpi). The FVC2002
DB2 database consists of L= 8 impressions from F = 100 fingers collected
from an optical sensor “FX2000” by Biometrika with image size 296× 560
and resolution 569 dpi. Fingerprint images in the DB1 and DB2 subsets
were collected under exaggerated distortions but were of good quality in
general. The FVC2006 database is comprised of four subsets, DB1 through
DB4, each consisting of F = 150 fingers with L= 12 impressions per finger.
Fingerprint image data collection in FVC2006 was carried out using a ther-
mal sweeping sensor with resulting image size 400× 500 and resolution 500
dpi. Examples of images from the FVC2002 and FVC2006 databases are
shown in Figure 3. Note the variability in the image acquisition process due
to using different sensors. Our methodology is applied to each of the three
subsets with two quality measures: (i) the NFIQ categorical quality measure
and (ii) the continuous quality measure described in Section 2.2. Results of
the parameter inference methodology for components of τ are as given in
Tables 4, 5 and 6 based on R= 200 samples from the posterior distribution
πa(τ |Yobs).
Inference for the PRC : We report the PRC corresponding to w = 12
matches using the method outlined in Section 5. Note that w = 12 is used
for illustrative purposes only; similar inference results on the PRC can be
obtained for any observed number of minutia matches w. The values of m1
and m2, the total number of extracted minutiae in the two prints, are fixed
at mean values for each database: These are (m1,m2) = (38,38), (40,40) and
(84,84) for FVC2002 DB1, FVC2002 DB2 and FVC2006 DB3, respectively.
The mean numbers for FVC2002 DB1 and DB2 are similar, and are much
smaller compared to FVC2006 DB3. Tables 7 and 8 give the results for
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Table 4
Posterior means (M), standard deviations (SD) and 99.9% credible intervals (CI ) for
components of τ based on FVC2002 DB1
Continuous, Qcon Categorical, Qcat
τ M SD CI τ M SD CI
θ0 −1.2801 0.0061 [−1.3003,−1.2599] θ0 −3.4857 0.0049 [−3.5018,−3.4697]
θ1 −5.8520 0.0137 [−5.8969,−5.8070] θ1 −0.7429 0.0013 [−0.7472,−0.7386]
− − − − θ2 −1.6144 0.0001 [−1.6145,−1.6143]
β0 −2.9047 0.0065 [−2.9259,−2.8835] β0 −2.7297 0.0064 [−2.7507,−2.7087]
log(σ2) −4.9518 0.1460 [−5.4321,−4.4716] log(σ2) −4.9537 0.1231 [−5.3588,−4.5486]
Table 5
Posterior means (M), standard deviations (SD) and 99.9% credible intervals (CI ) for
components of τ based on FVC2002 DB2
Continuous, Qcon Categorical, Qcat
τ M SD CI τ M SD CI
θ0 −0.6346 0.0020 [−0.6413,−0.6280] θ0 −2.9255 0.0019 [−2.9319,−2.9191]
θ1 −9.2982 0.0024 [−9.3062,−9.2901] θ1 −1.1496 0.0011 [−1.1532,−1.1460]
− − − − θ2 −0.9676 0.0007 [−0.9698,−0.9653]
− − − − θ3 −4.2827 0.0007 [−4.2850,−4.2804]
β0 −2.8721 0.0015 [−2.8769,−2.8672] β0 −2.8810 0.0001 [−2.8811,−2.8810]
log(σ2) −4.2974 0.0185 [−4.3581,−4.2366] log(σ2) −4.7817 0.0132 [−4.8252,−4.7382]
Table 6
Posterior means (M), standard deviations (SD) and 99.9% credible intervals (CI ) for
components of τ based on FVC2006 DB3
Continuous, Qcon Categorical, Qcat
τ M SD CI τ M SD CI
θ0 −6.1444 0.0025 [−6.1526,−6.1362] θ0 −5.4501 0.0014 [−5.4547,−5.4456]
θ1 −3.6746 0.0042 [−3.6885,−3.6607] θ1 −0.2537 0.0009 [−0.2565,−0.2509]
− − − − θ2 −1.1425 0.0011 [−1.1462,−1.1389]
− − − − θ3 −2.3753 0.0032 [−2.3859,−2.3647]
− − − − θ4 −2.9186 0.0029 [−2.9281,−2.9091]
β0 −3.1624 0.0011 [−3.1660,−3.1587] β0 −3.1734 0.0009 [−3.1763,−3.1705]
log(σ2) −3.9248 0.0127 [−3.9666,−3.8831] log(σ2) −4.2314 0.0065 [−4.2527,−4.2101]
FVC2002 DB1 and DB2 based on the categorical quality measure, whereas
Tables 9 and 10 give the results for the continuous quality measure. Similar
reports and conclusions are obtained for FVC2006 DB3 as in FVC2002 DB1
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Table 7
Inference on PRC(12|38,38) based on Qcat and FVC2002 DB1: M and CI are,
respectively, the posterior means and 99.9% credible intervals
1 2 3
Q1 \Q2 M CI M CI M CI
1 0.4082 [0.3759, 0.2653 [0.2424, 0.1541 [0.1325,
0.4404] 0.2882] 0.1758]
2 0.2653 [0.2424, 0.1383 [0.1113, 0.0565 [0.0451,
0.2882] 0.1654] 0.0679]
3 0.1541 [0.1325, 0.0565 [0.0451, 0.0130 [0.0095,
0.1758] 0.0679] 0.0164]
and DB2, so the relevant tables are not presented here but relegated to the
Appendix.
The posterior mean estimates of the PRC are monotonically decreasing
functions of increasing quality measures (for both NFIQ and the continuous
quality measure), as should be expected. As quality becomes better, erro-
neous decisions due to spurious minutia matches are reduced. In turn, this
component of uncertainty in the PRC evaluation is also decreased. Thus, for
high quality images, the PRC essentially captures the inherent inter-finger
variability in the population. The results reported in Tables 7–10 show the
importance of having good quality images when a decision of a positive
match has to be made. With the requirement of PRC ≈ 0.05, we see from
the four tables that this is achieved when both prints are of the best quality.
The PRC deteriorates quickly as the image quality degrades, as is indicated
by all the four tables, signifying the importance of very good quality images
for PRC assessment. For poor quality images, one has to be extra cautious
Table 8
Inference on PRC(12|40,40) based on Qcat and FVC2002 DB2: M and CI are,
respectively, the posterior means and 99.9% credible intervals
1 2 3 4
Q1 \Q2 M CI M CI M CI M CI
1 0.7958 [0.7873, 0.5858 [0.5733, 0.4734 [0.4605, 0.3881 [0.3750,
0.8044] 0.5983] 0.4862] 0.4013]
2 0.5858 [0.5733, 0.2725 [0.2609, 0.1556 [0.1469, 0.0902 [0.0838,
0.5983] 0.2841] 0.1643] 0.0967]
3 0.4734 [0.4605, 0.1556 [0.1469, 0.0667 [0.0608, 0.0275 [0.0245,
0.4862] 0.1643] 0.0726] 0.0306]
4 0.3881 [0.3750, 0.0902 [0.0838, 0.0275 [0.0245, 0.0073 [0.0062,
0.4013] 0.0967] 0.0306] 0.0085]
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Table 9
Inference on PRC(12|38,38) based on Qcon and FVC2002 DB1: M and CI are,
respectively, the posterior means and 99.9% credible intervals
0.3 0.4 0.5
Q1 \Q2 M CI M CI M CI
0.3 0.5358 [0.5126, 0.3908 [0.3671, 0.2868 [0.2650,
0.5591] 0.4146] 0.3087]
0.4 0.3908 [0.3671, 0.2383 [0.2174, 0.1455 [0.1280,
0.4146] 0.2592] 0.1631]
0.5 0.2868 [0.2650, 0.1455 [0.1280, 0.0724 [0.0610,
0.3087] 0.1631] 0.0838]
interpreting the extent of a fingerprint match, as the uncertainty associated
with a positive match is very large.
Tables 7–10 invite some comparisons. For DB1, the average values of Qcon
for each value of Qcat = 1,2,3 are 0.32,0.45,0.51, respectively; for DB2, the
average values of Qcon for each value of Qcat = 1,2,3,4 are 0.24, 0.38, 0.53
and 0.58, respectively. The levels of Qcon chosen in Tables 9 and 10 are
taken to reflect these average values. So, one would expect that the PRC
results presented for each database be consistent over Qcat and Qcon, es-
pecially when the value of PRC is small, say, less than 0.05, for example.
This is generally the case when we compare the entries of Tables 7 and 9
for DB1 and Tables 8 and 10 for DB2. Minor differences in the PRCs can
be attributed to the significant variability of Qcon for each level of Qcat in
the three databases. While we would expect Qcon values to be different cor-
responding to different levels of Qcat, we do not find this to be the case
empirically. There is significant overlap between the Qcon levels for the dif-
Table 10
Inference on PRC(12|40,40) based on Qcon and FVC2002 DB2: M and CI are,
respectively, the posterior means and 99.9% credible intervals
0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6
Q1 \Q2 M CI M CI M CI M CI
0.2 0.9152 [0.9087, 0.6967 [0.6811, 0.6292 [0.6134, 0.5965 [0.5797,
0.9217] 0.7123] 0.6451] 0.6134]
0.4 0.6967 [0.6811, 0.1956 [0.1816, 0.1158 [0.1051, 0.0873 [0.0787,
0.7123] 0.2096] 0.1265] 0.0959]
0.5 0.6292 [0.6134, 0.1158 [0.1051, 0.0559 [0.0489, 0.0371 [0.0323,
0.6451] 0.1265] 0.0630] 0.0420]
0.6 0.5965 [0.5797, 0.0873 [0.0787, 0.0371 [0.0323, 0.0228 [0.0193,
0.6134] 0.0959] 0.0420] 0.0264]
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Fig. 4. Boxplots showing the distribution of Qcon for each level of Qcat = 1,2 and 3 for
DB1.
ferent Qcat values. In the case when Qcat = 3 for DB1, the range of Qcon is
from 0.32 to 0.67, whereas it is 0.30 to 0.64 for Qcat = 2; see Figure 4 for an
idea of the range of these values for Qcon.
The PRCs corresponding to Qcon and Qcat are much larger for DB3 [see
Tables 1 and 2 in the supplemental article Dass, Lim and Maiti (2014)]
compared to DB1 and DB2, because (m1,m2) = (84,84), the mean values
for DB3, are much larger compared to the mean minutia numbers for DB1
and DB2. As a result, it is much more likely for random pairings to occur
in DB3 since more minutia are available for pairings.
Analysis and interpretation for the forensic practitioner : We illustrate
how PRCs can be obtained for a pair of prints under investigation in forensic
practice. The pair in Figure 1 has w= 7 matches with m1 = 35 and m2 = 49,
and Qcat = 2 and 3 for the left and right images, respectively. Since these
images are from FVC2002 DB2, we base our inference using the results from
this database. Corresponding to w= 7, the mean PRC is 0.6395 with 99.9%
credible interval [0.6263,0.6523]. The mean value implies that about 64%
of random pairings of impostor fingerprints will have minutia matches of 7
or more. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that the pair in Figure 1 is
something other than a random match (namely, an impostor pair).
The forensic practitioner can also perform a “what if” analysis. If the
quality of the images was good with Qcat taking value 4 for both images in
the pair, then the PRC is reduced to 0.3112, which still indicates this is more
likely a random pairing. With this analysis, a practitioner can eventually
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Table 11
Smallest w required for PRC(w|35,49)≤ 0.01
based on Qcat and DB2. ∗ indicates no such w
exists
Q1/Q2 1 2 3 4
1 ∗ ∗ 33 29
2 ∗ 25 21 18
3 33 21 17 15
4 29 18 15 13
conclude that the pairs in question are very likely a random match even in
the best case scenario where the image qualities are perfect.
The GLMM procedure can also be utilized to provide a guideline for
choices of w that will give desired PRC values for forensic testimony, for
example, PRC = 0.01 means that the error we make in declaring a positive
match when in fact it is not is at most 0.01. Table 11 provides the smallest
values for w for guaranteeing PRC(w|m1,m2)≤ 0.01 for different Qcat com-
binations when m1 = 35 and m2 = 49 based on DB2 with maximum possible
number of matches w being min(m1,m2) = 35. Based on the (2,3) [or (3,2)]
entry of the table, we see that the desired w to make a reliable decision for
the above prints in question should be 21. Thus, w = 7 is too low for making
a reliable positive match decision. The ∗ entries corresponding to the lowest
quality combinations indicate that even for the maximum value of w = 35,
the PRC never goes below 0.01. This again emphasizes that positive iden-
tification decisions cannot and should not be made with very low quality
images. Corresponding results can be obtained for DB1 and DB3 similarly,
and for Qcon, and are therefore not presented here.
7. Validation based on simulation. We performed simulation and vali-
dation experiments for DB1 and DB2 with F = 100 fingers and L= 8 im-
pressions per finger. Qcat and Qcon levels were fixed as in the respective
databases, but the total number of minutia matches Yij for each pair of
prints (i, j) (see Section 3 for the GLMM model and related notation) were
simulated from the GLMM model with fixed and known parameter values
τ = (θ′, log(σ2))′. The parameter values were fixed at the estimated values
obtained based on real data for DB1 and DB2, as given in Tables 4 and
5. As noted previously, our inference procedure yields posterior mean and
standard deviation estimates as well as 99.9% credible intervals as men-
tioned in Section 4. The coverage probabilities of each credible interval were
calculated for all the true parameter values as well as the true PRC values
based on 50 runs. We use the coverage probabilities as a measure of how
well the Laplace method approximates the exact GLMM likelihood for large
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F . Based on simulations, we find that the average coverage probabilities
for parameters and PRC values (averaged over all three databases) are ap-
proximately 98% and 98.5%, respectively. There is some underestimation
of the coverage probability but not grossly so, indicating that the Laplace
approximation to the GLMM likelihood is good even for F = 100.
8. Summary and discussion. To assess the extent of fingerprint individu-
ality for different image quality of prints, a GLMM framework and Bayesian
inference procedure is developed. Our inference scheme is able to provide a
point estimate as well as a credible interval for the PRC depending on the
image quality and the observed number of matches between a pair of prints.
Numerical reports of the PRC are obtained which can be used to validate
forensic testimony. Further, we also provide the smallest number of minutia
matches w needed to keep the PRC around a prespecified (small) number.
These matching numbers serve as a guideline and safeguard against falsely
deciding a positive match when the quality of the prints is unreliable. The
best report of fingerprint individuality is obtained when both or at least one
is of very good quality and the other is of good quality. No inference on in-
dividuality should be made when either print is of moderate to poor quality
as observed from our experimental results; having poor quality latent prints,
for example, severely hampers reliable matching results.
As far as we know, previous work has not considered including image qual-
ity in fingerprint individuality assessment in a quantitative manner and in a
formal statistical framework. Our work can be used as a baseline in forensic
applications for acquiring a quantitative assessment of individuality given
two prints in question. Regardless of whether the prints are of poor or good
quality, the methodology outlined will output a PRC value. This PRC value
could serve as a baseline and as a first guide to what extent there is evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt. The subsection of Section 6 titled “Analysis and
inference for the forensic practitioner” highlights the kinds of analysis that
may be conducted based on the GLMM methodology. The GLMM method
still does not utilize other fingerprint features such as type of minutiae de-
tected, ridge lengths and the class of fingerprint, which could potentially
further decrease the PRC and increase the extent of individualization. This
will be addressed in a future work.
Intra-finger correlations and inter-finger variability : The incorporation of
the random effects bf is very important in any statistical analysis involving
different fingers and multiple impressions per finger. The random effects bf
serve to model both intra-finger correlations as well as inter-finger variability.
Models that incorporate correlations due to multiple impressions of the same
finger give very different results compared to models that do not account
for this. For example, Dass and Jain (2006) show that the upper and lower
confidence bounds are misleadingly narrower if correlations, when present,
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are not taken into account. Similarly, the upper and lower credible bounds for
the PRC will be affected if one does not account for intra-finger correlations.
The random effects bf also serve another purpose. They model inter-finger
variability as we move from different fingers in the target population; the
database is merely a representative sample of the target population of fingers
for which the true population PRC is unknown and has to be estimated.
In Zhu, Dass and Jain (2007), the PRC was calculated for each pair of
print based on minutia distributions on the respective fingers. However,
this is not a representative PRC for the entire fingerprint database. Thus,
Zhu, Dass and Jain (2007) considered clustering the minutia distributions
for the entire fingerprint database. A more formal approach for obtaining
inference for population level PRCs was addressed in Dass and Li (2009).
The random effects bf in the present context represent deviations in the
target population, thus enabling inference for this overall population PRC
to be made.
Alignment of prints: The alignment prior to matching a pair of prints is
not a separate issue but a function of the detected minutia. Based on the
detected minutia in a print, the alignment with the other print is done by
first aligning a pair of detected minutiae (one from each print), then finding
the optimal translation (via the paired minutiae locations) and rotation (via
the paired minutiae directions) that exactly aligns the two. So, one can see
that the alignment is also a function of image quality: For poor quality
images, more spurious minutiae are detected and, hence, the alignment can
be more random (compared to the true alignment based on genuine minutia).
The randomness in the alignment also contributes to increasing the number
of minutia matches, Yij , for poor quality images. We do not model the
alignment separately because of the fact that its randomness, which depends
on spurious minutia, is captured in the observed Yij .
Fusion schemes: The difference in the estimates of fingerprint individ-
uality for the three databases can be attributed to the intrinsic nature of
the images in these separate databases. For the databases considered, the
intrinsic variability arises due to the different sensors used, the extent of
distortion due to varying skin elasticity and the composition of the sub-
jects (manual workers versus aged population and others). Where forensic
application is concerned, it is usually the practice to match a latent print
to template prints in a database. The sensor used to acquire the templates
is known and, therefore, it makes sense to report sensor-specific estimates
of fingerprint individuality. However, sensor-specific estimates should not be
too different from each other: A significant difference in the reported PRCs
(using sensor-specific models) indicates systematic bias of that particular
sensor toward or against random matching. As we mentioned and observed
earlier, we also find significant variability (as well as overlap) in Qcon values
corresponding to different Qcat levels. This motivates us to consider GLMMs
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and inference for PRCs based on combining two or more quality covariates
that measure different aspects of image clarity. It is possible to arrive at a
single measure of fingerprint individuality by incorporating additional ran-
dom effects (for different fingerprint databases and sensors) and fixed effects
(for two or more quality measures) in the GLMM formulation. We will in-
vestigate these fusion issues in our future research.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
For the supplemental article “A generalized mixed model framework for
assessing fingerprint individuality in presence of varying image quality”
(DOI: 10.1214/14-AOAS734SUPP; .pdf). The results quoted in the main
text are proved in Section 1 and the tables of PRC results for DB3 are in
Section 2.
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